West Texas and Ammonium Nitrate: Part 6

Here is what the  Kaufman County LEPC said they would do if one of their ammonium nitrate fertilizer facilities was involved in a fire:

"If it's in the building housing 50,000 pounds of ammonium nitrate we are going to evacuate the area and back off."

Source

I wrote, but did not post this: "Two very simple steps.  Have a community plan and read the ERG and 12 responders would probably - most assuredly - be alive today."

I have changed my mind on this.  I was wrong to conclude along with everyone else that had they only known, had a plan been developed, this tragedy would have been avoided or minimized.  I have changed my mind based on two issues in play that night:

1. The explosion took place within 20 minutes of the call
2. The responders were concerned about the release of anhydrous ammonia - a toxic gas - from the tanks that were at the site.

There is a third factor that plays into this for me as well; ammonium nitrate does not normally explode.

Doreen Strickland, president of the volunteer firefighters from nearby Abbott, pulled up to the plant as it exploded. One of her fire trucks was lifted in the air and slammed back down. Some of her men were inside, and she knew they had to be dead. At least three were killed. But she heard no one discuss ammonium nitrate ahead of the massive blast.

"Our main reason for evacuating at that time was because of the heat and intensity of the fire, and it was so close," Strickland said. The anhydrous ammonia "was a major concern." (1)

I write this blog and these posts as a way of helping me understand something that I should understand (because of my job) or because I am curious.  I write in "real time" meaning I look things up on the fly and have no editor other than maybe a couple of days while I re-write it for clarity and grammar.  The basic premise of these posts is to ask a question and then see if I can answer it.  In the process I end up going down a lot of different paths and looking at a lot of information as I try to bring clarity to the topic I am writing about.

So my question now is this; would discussing the ammonium nitrate with Doreen Strickland have changed anything?  I don't know, no one knows that.  I suspect that it would not for the simple fact that ammonium nitrate used to make fertilizer would not have taken precedence over the anhydrous ammonia tanks.  Ammonium nitrate can explode, but so can a can of gasoline or a propane cylinder.

Basically, and this is where I am willing to go with this, what we know about ammonium nitrate is that it does not explode within 20 minutes of a fire being reported.  We know this now, but we did not understand this at the time.

I train folks to protect themselves.  This is why I give my students instruction on how to use a Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS), the new Safety Data Sheet (SDS), instruction on how to look up information on the internet using CAMEO or WISER, and how to use the Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG).

Source

So let's start there.  Before the explosion what did we understand about ammonium nitrate that is used to produce a fertilizer?

A good place to start is California.  If you buy into the "Texas businesses can do whatever they please" mindset then you must know that California is the polar opposite.

I was looking up the definition for "ammonitrate" which is the term they use in the 2001 Toulouse, France explosion (it is the French term for "granular ammonium nitrate, used directly in agriculture").  This lead me to the California link:

Clicking on that link brings up the EPA's Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office (CEPP) "Alert."

Source

This Alert is dated December of 1997.  I Google'd the name and it still shows 1997.  Here is what the EPA's CEPP says and CalEPA presumably supports:

Ammonium nitrate can be exploded under certain conditions. These must include added energy (heat, shock), especially under conditions of confinement or presence of contaminants. Although ammonium nitrate generally is used safely and normally is stable and unlikely to explode accidentally, accidental explosions of ammonium nitrate have resulted in loss of lives and destruction of property. These accidents rarely occur, but when they do, they have high impacts.

That's what I understood about ammonium nitrate.  I was not alone in that understanding:

Ammonium nitrate, in solid or molten form or in solution, is a stable compound and generally is difficult to explode.

Ammonium nitrate by itself does not burn, but in contact with other combustible materials, it increases the fire hazard. It can support and intensify a fire even in the absence of air. Fires involving ammonium nitrate can release toxic nitrogen oxides and ammonia. A fire involving ammonium nitrate in an enclosed space could lead to an explosion. Closed containers may rupture violently when heated.

It has the potential to exploded, but it takes energy to do so:

Ammonium nitrate may explode, however, when exposed to strong shock or to high temperature under confinement. In a large quantity of ammonium nitrate, localized areas of high temperature may be sufficiently confined by the total quantity to initiate an explosion. The explosion of a small quantity of ammonium nitrate in a confined space (e.g., a pipe) may initiate the explosion of larger quantities (e.g., in an associated vessel).

That's what I understand about ammonium nitrate and that's probably what the plant manager - who died with the responders - also understood as well.

It can explode, but it takes certain conditions to do so.  The explosion happened within 20 minutes of the fire being reported.  History does not show a building holding ammonium nitrate exploding when on fire.  That's not what we have seen in the past:

• 1921 Germany explosion from attempts to break up large piles of solidified ammonium nitrate using blasting explosives.
• 1947 Texas City - explosion in ship cargo holds (confinement).
• 1994 ammonium nitrate solution explodes during manufacturing process.
• 2001 Toulouse, France explosion in process building - unknown cause
• 2009 Bryan, Texas (100 miles south of West) Fire in fertilizer plant with over 200 tons of ammonium nitrate. No explosion took place.

What we see now is something different.  We still do not know what initiated the blast.  It should not have exploded.  It did, and that requires an answer as to why.

We need to, in my opinion, move away from this idea that had a plan been in place or if everyone would have known about the ammonium nitrate that all of this could have been avoided.

Maybe, but I doubt it.  In 20 minutes of the call it exploded.  Concern over the anhydrous ammonia tanks was not a misguided approach at that time.  Even though ammonium nitrate can explode, it usually does not.  It did not in the fire in Bryan 100 miles south of West in 2009 so why would we expect it to explode here?

So where do we take this from here?  What should we do in the future?

Next post: West Texas and Ammonium Nitrate: Part 7

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West Texas and Ammonium Nitrate: Part 5

I am glad I put the kibosh on the direction I was going with this topic.  Actually it was my wife who told me to back off on the indignation.  That was good advice because while I was changing direction I learned of the 20 minute time frame from initial call to explosion.  Maybe others were aware of how quickly it happened, but I was not.  That information, that time frame, changes the dynamics.

In the post I wrote but did not publish I said this: "If you have responsibility for the health and welfare of people you should understand your job well enough to make sound decisions so that you don't hurt or kill people you are supposed to protect."

That assumes that had they had the information on ammonium nitrate's potential to explode it would have changed things.  Had they had an emergency plan in place, drilled on the plan, looked at every thing there was on responding to a fire where ammonium nitrate is involved, the outcome would have been different.

Maybe...but now I am not so sure.

I used to do emergency response to hazardous chemical incidents.  I have done a lot and they are always different.  They involve a lot of assumptions but follow the same basic measures.  Protect public health and minimize environmental harm.  So when I read this:

Associated Press interviews with first-responders suggest that firefighters' foremost fear was a poisonous cloud of anhydrous ammonia.

I went back to my old days as a HazMat responder and looked at it objectively.  What would I have told them to do if I was the guy in charge?

And if I am objective and honest with myself, I would have had them focus on the anhydrous ammonia tanks while we evacuated the people in the isolation area:

2012 ERG

I would have recommended that those folks 1.3 miles surrounding the facility - not just downwind - be evacuated, and until that time we would have concentrated on keeping the anhydrous ammonia tanks from rupturing.  Then I would have recommended, once the evacuation was underway, that since it is a large fire involving ammonium nitrate that we follow the ERG 140 recommendation:

2012 ERG 140

The 1.3 mile evacuation for the anhydrous ammonia would also cover the ammonium nitrate explosion potential.  When public safety was completed then I would have recommended letting it burn.

2012 ERG 140

That's what I would have most likely recommended in an EPCRA LEPC planning meeting and that's what I would have recommended at the time of the response.  In hindsight that would have been the wrong decision, as the AP points out:

They didn't know, and probably could not imagine, that the plant would soon explode into a deadly fireball and lay waste to much of the community. Instead, they were more concerned with preventing toxic gas from leaking out of the facility and drifting into nearby homes.

That's the focus I would have taken even if I knew there was 200 tons of ammonium nitrate in the building that was now on fire.

Why?

Because ammonium nitrate does not normally explode within 20 minutes of catching on fire.  It has the potential to explode, but that requires a shock wave to initiate the decomposition.  Under almost all normal conditions, ammonium nitrate behaves as an oxidizer and in a fire, though the potential for explosion is there, the concern is the intensity of the fire and the release of ammonia gas in the decomposition.

Ammonia nitrate in a facility that makes fertilizer should not explode.  Should not because that's not what we normally see it do.  That's not what it did in 2009 in Bryan, Texas 100 miles South of West, Texas:

Texas farm country is dotted with fertilizer plants in towns served by volunteer firefighters. But a 2009 blaze at the El Dorado Chemical Co. in Bryan, Texas, unfolded much differently than the disaster in West. Bryan firefighters knew a welder had accidentally heated up an ammonium nitrate bin and that the chemical was smoldering. They evacuated the area and let the facility burn to the ground. Nothing exploded. (AP)

Even though, as the AP points out: "...the plant's vast stockpile of a common fertilizer, ammonium nitrate, which can also serve as a cheap alternative to dynamite."

Yes, ammonium nitrate can be used to blow things up.  Farmers use it to remove stumps and rocks.  And yes, in the "1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and authorities said the plant made materials similar to that used to fuel the bomb that tore apart that city's Murrah Federal Building." (1)

But ammonium nitrate is just an ingredient.  The fact that it can be used to make a bomb makes it no different than acetone used to make Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP) or glycerin to make nitroglycerin.

Ammonium nitrate is an oxidizer, not an explosive.  It has the potential to explode, just like a propane cylinder hooked up to your grill.

The "potential" to explode and "will" explode are two different things.  Now in hindsight we can look at ammonium nitrate differently.  But hindsight was not what these guys had in the 20 minutes it took from the initial call to the explosion.

The one common denominator that must be present is an initiating source.  Fire is not normally the thing that does it.  Timmothy McVey lit a fuse to a blasting cap that initiated the ammonium nitrate/fuel mixture in five 55 gallon drums in the back of a Ryder truck.  The Boston Marathon bombers used ordinary fireworks to provide the explosives but that required a blasting cap on a timer to initiate the blast.  Ammonium nitrate can explode in a fire, but it takes a shock wave faster than the speed of sound to do so.  What, in 20 minutes, produced that shock wave that caused the ammonium nitrate to explode?

My focus would have been on evacuation and immediate concern of the anhydrous ammonia tanks rupturing.

My focus now changes with this new information.  How likely is ammonium nitrate to explode when it is involved in a fire?  That's the question we need answered for West.  What initiated the ammonium nitrate?

From there we can come up with better plans on how to store the ammonium nitrate and respond to a fire should that possibility happen.


Next post: West Texas and Ammonium Nitrate: Part 6

West Texas and Ammonium Nitrate: Part 4

I've been busy with work and have had little time to follow up on this.  Three day weekend, so I am going to try and wrap up my thoughts on this event.

At this point in time, as of today, they do not know what triggered the blast.  They know it was the ammonium nitrate that exploded, they do not know why it did, or what situation enable it to.

What we do know is that the explosion took place about 20 minutes after the initial response by the fire department.  This bit of information changes my original approach.  I'm still on the same track, only that short time span makes it necessary to re-evaluate my recommendations.

Let's continue basically where we left off.  I want to look at this statement by Reuters:

In February 2013, the company submitted its 2012 Tier II report to Texas DSHS. The county's Local Emergency Planning Committee has no record of receiving a copy, said Mike Dixon, a McLennan County attorney.

It is unclear whether the company ever filed a Tier II report with the local fire department.

What is clear is that when the plant caught fire on April 17, people inside the fire trucks and ambulances that rushed to the scene did not know how much ammonium nitrate was on hand or how quickly it could produce a massive explosion. They had never trained for a scenario like the one that unfolded, said firefighter Kevin Maler.

In the 10 years he has served on the West Volunteer Fire Department, Maler said he never saw West Fertilizer's Tier II report. He added that the department never conducted drills to prepare for an explosion at the facility. Those observations were confirmed by other first responders Reuters interviewed who did not want to be named.

"No one ever knew you were going into something like that," Maler said.

It is easy to play armchair quarterback and assign blame.  We Americans are really good at that.  I am writing this knowing - knowing without any reservation - that the statement "No one ever knew you were going into something like that," should not have been an issue for these responders.

A fire in a fertilizer factory assumes that chemicals are present.  This is, or should be, self-evident.  If it is not, then you need to go back to basic training.  That's not meant to be harsh, that's just common sense.

100 miles away in Bryan Texas there was a fire at a fertilizer plant that resulted in the largest evacuation in United States history.  100 miles away.  It did not blow up, but the chemical of concern was ammonium nitrate.

Fertilizer facility = chemicals inside.  Ask question; what chemicals are we dealing with?  Do not proceed until you know what chemicals are present.  Assume that ammonium nitrate and/or anhydrous ammonia are present.  Look in Emergency Response Guidebook to see how to proceed.

2012 ERG

This is where my new information about what took place - the time frame - changes my view on whether this knowledge might have saved them.  Here is what WTNH-TV News 8 "Connecticut's first television station" writes:

West Mayor Tommy Muska said he did not know how much the firefighters knew about the chemicals on the property, but the fire crew included a manager from the fertilizer plant.

Cody Dragoo "would have known exactly what was in there and the dangers that were there," the mayor said, explaining why he believes firefighters were backing away from the flames at the West Fertilizer Co.

They did not get away fast enough. The plant blew up within 20 minutes of the first call for help. Dragoo was among 10 firefighters and paramedics killed in the blast. Two residents helping to fight the fire were also killed, along with two other people.

I am now unsure if that knowledge would have played any difference in the outcome.  20 minutes from call to explosion gives very little time for them to access the situation and focus on life safety of residence and occupants.

They were aware, according to news reports, that anhydrous ammonia was present in tanks, and they were cooling those off to prevent a catastrophic release of the gas, which is a known poison/toxic inhalation hazard.

Associated Press interviews with first-responders suggest that firefighters' foremost fear was a poisonous cloud of anhydrous ammonia. But the greater threat turned out to be the plant's vast stockpile of a common fertilizer, ammonium nitrate, which can also serve as a cheap alternative to dynamite.

In hindsight that's true.  And with this knowledge we may put together a standard operating plan for response to a facility where ammonium nitrate is stored.  I'll focus later on all the dumb things said about ammonium nitrate by the press and the ill-informed.

Here is what the 2012 ERG book says about responding to a large fire involving ammonium nitrate (ERG 140):

Now ammonium nitrate does not care if it is in a cargo tank, trailer, or warehouse floor.  There was a massive fire at the West facility and the ERG says "withdraw and let fire burn."

Simple enough, if they knew they were dealing with ammonium nitrate, which they should of because the fertilizer plant manager was with them, and had they read guide 140 in the 2012 ERG, they would have know to withdraw.  How far?  Well let's see what the ERG says:

Simple! ...until you factor in the anhydrous ammonia.  Let's look at the ERG for that chemical.  When you look up the name "anhydrous ammonia" you notice that it is highlighted in green:

What they teach you (and this includes me as well) in training for a chemical emergency response is this:

Anything in green is recognized as a don't-breath-it-because-it-can-kill-you hazardous materials.

So if the responders and the facility manager understood that there was a fire and that fire was where tanks containing anhydrous ammonia were stored, the emphasis - priority - might have been placed on keeping those tanks from rupturing.  What we teach responders when they learn to use the ERG is that the green highlighted chemical names require them to go to the "Table of Initial Isolation" page where they are told this:

At the point of the response -within that 20 minute window -the responders appear to have been focused on keeping the anhydrous ammonia from being released.  They had two situations going on at once with two terrible outcomes that had the potential to take place.

This changes the dynamics.  And all of this decision making was taking place in the first 20 minutes.


Next post: West Texas and Ammonium Nitrate: Part 5

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Air in the Barnett Shale: Bibliography

Information on air quality in the Barnett Shale Area & Oil and Gas Production Environmental Issues in General.


TCEQ: Barnett Shale Air Sampling Map Viewer


TCEQ: Barnett Shale: Technical Questions Answered

TCEQ: A Commitment to Air Quality in the Barnett Shale

TCEQ: Barnett Shale: Latest Activities

TCEQ: January 4, 2010 Barnett Shale Formation Area Monitoring Projects

TCEQ: January 27, 2010 Health Effects for Barnett Shale

TCEQ: RG-482 - Common Environmental Requirements for Regulated Oil and Gas Operations

TCEQ: Conservativeness of TCEQ's currect effects screening levels (ESLs) for carbon disulfide and air samples in areas of oil & gas exploration

TCEQ: Presentation by John Sadlier and Dr. Michael Honeycutt on TCEQ's Barnett Shale Study

RRC: Barnett Shale Information


RRC: Eagle Ford Information


RRC: Oil & Gas Permits


RRC: Oil and Gas Division - Texas Administrative Code-  Water Protection


RRC: Memorandum of Understanding between the Railroad Commission of Texas (RRC) and the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ)


Environmentally Friendly Drilling System (EFD)


Congressional Research Service:  Comparison of Selected Oil and Gas Regulations in Texas and Colorado


DISH: Alisa Rich & Wolf Eagle Environmental Reports for Town of Dish, Texas


FWLN: Feb 2011: Fort Worth League of Neighborhoods Report to ISD: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY CHANGES FOR GAS DRILLING NEAR SCHOOLS


Kleinfelder: January 2011: Town of Flower mound Limited Air Quality Evaluation


BSEEC: Ambient Air Quality study, Natural Gas Sites Cities of Fort Worth & Arlington, Texas, Barnett Shale Energy Education Council (BSEEC)


ERG: Natural Gas Air Quality Study Interim Report Executive Summary

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