West Texas and Ammonium Nitrate: Part 4

I've been busy with work and have had little time to follow up on this.  Three day weekend, so I am going to try and wrap up my thoughts on this event.

At this point in time, as of today, they do not know what triggered the blast.  They know it was the ammonium nitrate that exploded, they do not know why it did, or what situation enable it to.

What we do know is that the explosion took place about 20 minutes after the initial response by the fire department.  This bit of information changes my original approach.  I'm still on the same track, only that short time span makes it necessary to re-evaluate my recommendations.

Let's continue basically where we left off.  I want to look at this statement by Reuters:

In February 2013, the company submitted its 2012 Tier II report to Texas DSHS. The county's Local Emergency Planning Committee has no record of receiving a copy, said Mike Dixon, a McLennan County attorney.

It is unclear whether the company ever filed a Tier II report with the local fire department.

What is clear is that when the plant caught fire on April 17, people inside the fire trucks and ambulances that rushed to the scene did not know how much ammonium nitrate was on hand or how quickly it could produce a massive explosion. They had never trained for a scenario like the one that unfolded, said firefighter Kevin Maler.

In the 10 years he has served on the West Volunteer Fire Department, Maler said he never saw West Fertilizer's Tier II report. He added that the department never conducted drills to prepare for an explosion at the facility. Those observations were confirmed by other first responders Reuters interviewed who did not want to be named.

"No one ever knew you were going into something like that," Maler said.

It is easy to play armchair quarterback and assign blame.  We Americans are really good at that.  I am writing this knowing - knowing without any reservation - that the statement "No one ever knew you were going into something like that," should not have been an issue for these responders.

A fire in a fertilizer factory assumes that chemicals are present.  This is, or should be, self-evident.  If it is not, then you need to go back to basic training.  That's not meant to be harsh, that's just common sense.

100 miles away in Bryan Texas there was a fire at a fertilizer plant that resulted in the largest evacuation in United States history.  100 miles away.  It did not blow up, but the chemical of concern was ammonium nitrate.

Fertilizer facility = chemicals inside.  Ask question; what chemicals are we dealing with?  Do not proceed until you know what chemicals are present.  Assume that ammonium nitrate and/or anhydrous ammonia are present.  Look in Emergency Response Guidebook to see how to proceed.

2012 ERG

This is where my new information about what took place - the time frame - changes my view on whether this knowledge might have saved them.  Here is what WTNH-TV News 8 "Connecticut's first television station" writes:

West Mayor Tommy Muska said he did not know how much the firefighters knew about the chemicals on the property, but the fire crew included a manager from the fertilizer plant.

Cody Dragoo "would have known exactly what was in there and the dangers that were there," the mayor said, explaining why he believes firefighters were backing away from the flames at the West Fertilizer Co.

They did not get away fast enough. The plant blew up within 20 minutes of the first call for help. Dragoo was among 10 firefighters and paramedics killed in the blast. Two residents helping to fight the fire were also killed, along with two other people.

I am now unsure if that knowledge would have played any difference in the outcome.  20 minutes from call to explosion gives very little time for them to access the situation and focus on life safety of residence and occupants.

They were aware, according to news reports, that anhydrous ammonia was present in tanks, and they were cooling those off to prevent a catastrophic release of the gas, which is a known poison/toxic inhalation hazard.

Associated Press interviews with first-responders suggest that firefighters' foremost fear was a poisonous cloud of anhydrous ammonia. But the greater threat turned out to be the plant's vast stockpile of a common fertilizer, ammonium nitrate, which can also serve as a cheap alternative to dynamite.

In hindsight that's true.  And with this knowledge we may put together a standard operating plan for response to a facility where ammonium nitrate is stored.  I'll focus later on all the dumb things said about ammonium nitrate by the press and the ill-informed.

Here is what the 2012 ERG book says about responding to a large fire involving ammonium nitrate (ERG 140):

Now ammonium nitrate does not care if it is in a cargo tank, trailer, or warehouse floor.  There was a massive fire at the West facility and the ERG says "withdraw and let fire burn."

Simple enough, if they knew they were dealing with ammonium nitrate, which they should of because the fertilizer plant manager was with them, and had they read guide 140 in the 2012 ERG, they would have know to withdraw.  How far?  Well let's see what the ERG says:

Simple! ...until you factor in the anhydrous ammonia.  Let's look at the ERG for that chemical.  When you look up the name "anhydrous ammonia" you notice that it is highlighted in green:

What they teach you (and this includes me as well) in training for a chemical emergency response is this:

Anything in green is recognized as a don't-breath-it-because-it-can-kill-you hazardous materials.

So if the responders and the facility manager understood that there was a fire and that fire was where tanks containing anhydrous ammonia were stored, the emphasis - priority - might have been placed on keeping those tanks from rupturing.  What we teach responders when they learn to use the ERG is that the green highlighted chemical names require them to go to the "Table of Initial Isolation" page where they are told this:

At the point of the response -within that 20 minute window -the responders appear to have been focused on keeping the anhydrous ammonia from being released.  They had two situations going on at once with two terrible outcomes that had the potential to take place.

This changes the dynamics.  And all of this decision making was taking place in the first 20 minutes.


Next post: West Texas and Ammonium Nitrate: Part 5

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