Flint Water: A Political Football. Part 4

Let's go over the data and some important points that we have talked about so far:

• 104 ug/L that jumped to 397 ug/L after ferric chloride was added.
•  Children in this home with blood-lead levels (BLL) that went from 2 to 3 ug/dL.
• Lead and Copper Rule (LCR) states that if lead concentrations exceed an action level of 15 ppb,,,the system must undertake a number of additional actions to control corrosion.
• LCR states that if the action level for lead is exceeded, the system must also inform the public about steps they should take to protect their health and may have to replace lead service lines under their control

September 25th we get the "political football" email:

The DEQ (Department of Environmental Quality) and DCH (Department of Community Health) feel that some in Flint are taking the very sensitive issue of children's exposure to lead and trying to turn it into a political football claiming the departments are underestimating the impacts on the populations and particularly trying to shift responsibility to the state," [source]

We know that none of the LCR stuff (those two last bullets) were done. We seem, at least to me, to have a state agency - the MDEQ - that does not fully understand its responsibilities...which falls under the state's responsibility...which becomes the governor's responsibility (the buck stops here).

Flint's failure to act is one thing, but the state not stepping in is another.  Why does the state have responsibility over Flint's inaction to comply with the LCR?  Because of this thing we call "primacy" that is written into the Safe Drinking Waster Act (SDWA).

State Primacy: Section 1413 authorizes states to assume primary oversight and enforcement responsibility (primacy) for public water systems. To assume primacy, states must adopt regulations at least as stringent as national requirements, develop adequate procedures for enforcement (including conducting monitoring and inspections), adopt authority for administrative penalties, and maintain records and make reports as EPA may require. States also must develop a plan for providing safe drinking water under emergency circumstances. Currently, 55 of 57 states and territories have primacy authority for the public water system supervision (PWSS) program. [source]

According to the EPA, "Currently, all states and territories have primacy."  Since Michigan is a state, well...they have primacy, which means they have oversight and enforcement responsibility.

Should the MDEQ have understood their role?  Should they have done something to help Flint comply?  Here is what the EPA writes about PWSS:

As codified in 40 CFR Part 142 Subpart B, to obtain primacy the State must have regulations that are no less stringent than the regulations promulgated by EPA. States with primacy implement and enforce State drinking water regulations. At all levels of government, regulatory agencies have some discretion in determining what type of enforcement action to take and when to impose penalties. 

The EPA goes on to tell the state:

The most successful State efforts to achieve compliance are often preventive efforts and informal enforcement actions. Preventive efforts are aimed at notifying and educating an operator about requirements, and can result in avoiding critical problems. These activities are based on the belief that most water suppliers want to do the right thing if they understand how and why it must be done. 

It's not rocket science.

Shall we continue with the timeline?

March 27, 2015: Based on a suspected conflict of interest at the local health department that conducted the February 2015 BLL testing, the Walters’ take their child to a healthcare facility in a different location to have his blood lead re-tested. The result from this BLL test (6.5 ug/dL) is significantly higher than the February BLL test (3 ug/dL).

We will come back to the blood-lead levels.  Right now I want to focus on the lead in the water from the tap.

April 3, 2015: The water is shut off at Walters’ residence due to the high lead levels.

Okay...

April 28, 2015: The water at the Walters’ residence was turned back on temporarily to collect additional water samples.

Cool, more data!

The kitchen tap was flushed at low flow for 25 minutes the night before (on April 27, 2015) the sequential sampling conducted on April 28, 2015. On April 28, 2015, 30 Sequential samples were collected at Walters residence. Extremely high lead levels were found in all samples. The minimum lead value was 200 ug/L; the average lead value was 2,429 ug/L; and the maximum lead value was 13,200 ug/L.

Here is what the EPA memo says about this sampling in more detail:

Since the water had stagnated for an extended period of time, the kitchen tap was flushed for 25 minutes the night before collecting the samples. Three sets of samples were collected at different flow rates (10 at low flow, 10 at medium flow and 10 at high flow).

I was skeptical of those high numbers.  That's a lot of lead to leach out.  So I did some research to see what levels of lead have been shown to leach out of plumbing that contains lead.

Source is behind a paywall:
Effect of pH on the concentrations of lead and trace contaminants in drinking water:
A combined batch, pipe loop and sentinel home study

Okay, it looks like 30 ppm leaching out is a possibility, especially with corrosive water. I'll take those sample results as sound.  My gosh though, 13 ppm - parts per MILLION - was found. That's a lot of lead.

We now have some compelling and convincing data that tells us that lead can be in the Flint drinking water.  Again though, this is just what we found in one house.

By May 6th, a lot more data and conformation is coming in.  From the Del Toral's EPA memo we learn this:

EPA inspection reveals that the portion of the Walters’ service line from the water main to the external shut-off valve on the corner of Bryant Street and Browning Avenue is made of lead. EPA’s inspection also confirms that the portion of the Walters’ service line from the home to the external shut-off valve appears to be galvanized iron pipe. 

Now we know pretty much for sure that it was Flint who put the lead into the water coming out of the Walters' house.  It was Flint's water corrosivity that was leaching the lead and it was lead plumbing that Flint owned where the lead was leaching from.

EPA Region 5 collects a set of sequential samples from each of two residences on Bryant Street which are connected to the same main as the Walters’ old service line. The results tells us that:

• Home #1 (4526 Bryant Street) does not appear to have a lead service line and lead results in all samples are low.

• Home #2 (4614 Bryant Street) indicate that the portion of the service line from the external shut-off valve to the water main is likely made of lead, which is consistent with the historical practice in Flint. The sampling had a high lead result (peak value) of 22 ug/L.

Now we have a second home with lead above the 15 ppb LCR threshold.

The City of Flint tests the water at 216 Browning Avenue at resident’s request, again using a firstdraw, pre-flushed sampling protocol, which yielded a high lead result (22 ug/L). The City of Flint tests the water at 631 Alvord Avenue, yielding a high lead result (42 ug/L).

Now we have four houses with knowledge of lead above the LCR threshold of 15 ppb.

The suspected lead items have been removed from the service line to the Walters' home on May 6th.

The water in the Walter's home is tested again on May 13th.

All kitchen tap and bathroom tap results for lead and copper were low, confirming that the sources of lead were external to the home. 

What happened next?

Next post: Flint Water: A Political Football.  Part 5